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Recently, there has been a great deal of skepticism about appeals 
to intuitions in philosophy. Appeals to intuition often get expressed 
in the form of what ‘we’ believe. Many people take the ‘we’ in this 
context to refer to what the folk believe. So the claim about what 
we believe is an empirical claim. And it looks like the support for 
this claim comes from a biased sample consisting solely of analytic 
philosophers. In this paper I want to explain a different way 
appeals to intuition are used in the literature and why it survives 
such attacks. The basic idea, which comes from Bernard Williams, 
is that the 'we' used in many appeals to intuitions is not a referring 
expression at all. The appeal to intuition is not a claim about what 
any group of individuals believes. Rather it is an invitation to make 
a judgment. I argue that when you hear a philosopher say 'P is 
what we intuitively believe' the proper response is not 'who is this 
'we'?’ The proper response is to wonder whether one ought to 
accept P. !
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1. Who is this “we”? !
Recently, there has been a great deal of skepticism about appeals to 
intuitions in philosophy. Appeals to intuition often get expressed in the 
form of what ‘we’ believe. Many people take the ‘we’ in this context to 
refer to what the folk believe or what the folk would believe upon 
(suitably qualified) reflection. So the claim about what we believe is an 
empirical claim. And it looks like the support for this claim comes from a 
biased sample consisting solely of analytic philosophers. This leads 
Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich to tell us that “the best reaction to the High-
SES, Western philosophy professor who tries to draw normative 
conclusions from the facts about ‘our’ intuitions is to ask: What do you 
mean by ‘we’?” (2001: 455). Likewise, Bishop and Trout tells us that in 
standard analytic epistemology (SAE) the theories we get “merely tell us 
how we do make epistemic judgments (and by ‘we’, we mean the tiny 
fraction of the world’s population who has studied SAE)” (2005: 110). 
The skeptics can also point out the empirical tests that have been done 
show a high degree of instability and variability in what the folk 
intuitively believe. Hence, appeals to intuition are highly suspect and 
ought to be avoided. 
In this paper I want to explain one common way appeals to intuition are 
used in the literature and why it survives such attacks. The basic idea, 
which comes from Bernard Williams, is that the 'we' used in many 
appeals to intuitions is not a referring expression at all. The appeal to 
intuition is not a claim about what any group of individuals believes. 
Rather it is an invitation to make a judgment. Here is how Williams 
expresses the point in a footnote to Shame and Necessity. 
More than one friend, in reading this book in an earlier version, has asked 
who this ubiquitous “we” represents … I hope it means more than people 
who already think as I do. The best I can say is that “we” operates not 
through a previously fixed designation, but through invitation. (The same 
is true, I believe, of “we” in much philosophy, and particularly in ethics.) 
It is not a matter of “I” telling “you” what I and others think, but of my 
asking you to consider to what extent you and I think some things and 
perhaps need to think others. (1993: 171). 
On this reading, when philosophers say 'we' believe that P they are not 
saying anything about what a group believes. Rather it is an invitation to 
think through a possibility and make a judgment that P. It also seems to 
express a kind of confidence that audience will accept the invitation 
because P is very plausible and hard to deny. It expresses a kind of 
optimism that P will fit particularly well with judgments about similar 
cases and rejection of P will fit poorly. So, on this interpretation of the 
claim that 'P is intuitive' or 'what we believe', the phrase expresses an 
invitation to think through some possibility and judge that P. It also 
typically implies that P is very plausible and expresses optimism that  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audience will accept it. So it is natural for the author to go on as if it is 
now common ground. However, on this interpretation of appeal to 
intuition, it is only the invitation that is essential. 
In this paper I defend Williams' account of the way 'we' works in some 
philosophical debates. I defend it as a way to understand many, though 
certainly not all, appeals to intuition in the literature. I argue for three 
claims. The first is that if we accept this account of what philosophers 
mean by saying that P is intuitive, the skeptical argument does not get off 
the ground. The second is that there are some very good reasons to read 
appeals to intuition in this way. And finally there appears to be nothing 
epistemically suspect about such appeals. 
So we are attacking the claim that when philosophers claim that ‘P is 
intuitive’ they are making an empirical claim about what individuals 
believe that could be studied by the methods of empirical science. 
Arguably, this is one of the fundamental assumptions of experimental 
philosophy. Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007) claims it is. They write, 
“there is a shared distrust of philosophers’ (common) claims of the 
general form ‘X is intuitive’ … These are claims philosophers usually 
make based upon armchair reflection … But these methods of 
determining what is widely accepted seem highly susceptible to well-
known biases.” (2007: 125). Here they are claiming that the intuitive is 
just what is widely accepted. I hope to show that this is not true for many 
interesting uses of ‘intuitive’ and associated terms. I should note though 
that I do not take this paper as an attack on all experimental philosophy 
because I do not agree with Nadelhoffer and Nahmias that the claim 
above is a fundamental assumption. There are a number of different 
projects that fall under the heading of experimental philosophy and it 
seems to me some of it can stand without this assumption. Knobe (2006) 
seems a clear case. In fact, other work by Nadelhoffer and Nahmias with 
colleagues, I have in mind Nahmias, Morris, Nadlehoffer and Turner 
(2006), does not seem to need it.  But I won’t make that case here. The 1
only goal is to show that in some cases asking whom this 'we' refers to is 
misplaced. It is to take one's eye off the ball.  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2. Why Skepticism about Intuition Misses the Mark !
The skeptic attacks appeals to intuition because they take such an appeal 
to be making a claim about what most people believe. They take it to be a 
prediction about how people are likely to respond to cases. Empirical 
tests can be performed to see if people do make those judgments. The 
tests that have been done seem to show that many people do not make the 
relevant judgments.  2
However, if we understand the function of 'we' in the way described by 
Williams, it cannot be tested in such a way. A philosopher making such 
an appeal is not making a claim about any set of individuals. Instead, he 
is inviting one to make a judgment. Hence, showing that some set of 
individuals does not find the claim intuitive simply misses the mark. 
What such a philosopher is saying when he says that P is intuitive is that 
he finds P to be the thing to think on the matter. Indeed, he is confident 
his audience will as well. So he invites them to do so. How would such 
an invitation be shown to be illegitimate? We will return to this issue 
below. However, since no claim about the folk is being made, it seems 
that a survey of the folk is philosophically irrelevant. 
On this understanding of appeals to intuition the fact that P is intuitive is 
not doing any special work. ‘P is intuitive’ invites one to judge that P, 
while expressing the expectation that the audience will do so.  Hence, the 3
question is whether to accept the invitation or not. That is, we must think 
through the case and make some judgment about P. Of course, in many 
philosophical debates there will not universal agreement about what to 
think about P upon reflection. And, as Weatherson (2003) argues, even if 
P is a counterexample to some theory that may not mean we need to 
reject the theory. All of this will depend on the details of the theory and 
the case at hand. I will not offer any guidelines about that here. Yet, it is 
important to see that often no claim whatsoever is being made about what 
the folk believe. To ask who believes that P is to ask the wrong the 
question, one should focus on whether one ought to believe that P. !
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3. Is This the Right Way to Read Appeals to Intuition? !
It must be admitted that not all appeals to intuition are plausibly read as 
invitations. Many philosophers mean by ‘intuition’ as special sort of a 
priori evidence that has various features. Bealer (1999) is a prime 
example. Roughly, Bealer claims that intuition is a distinct propositional 
attitude produced by reason in which some claim seems to be a necessary 
truth.  The line taken up here is not open to Bealer or like-minded 4
philosophers.  5
Whether or not there are intuitions in the sense that Bealer describes is a 
very important epistemological issue. Yet, not every appeal to intuition in 
the philosophical literature should be understood to be invoking such 
states. This is because many people who are not rationalists still 
sometimes appeal to intuitions. For instance, I am a moral sentimentalist 
who rejects moral rationalism. Yet, I am perfectly happy to appeal to 
intuitions in teaching normative moral theory. I am certainly not claiming 
any access to a moral truth revealed by reason. I expect the same is true 
of a fair number of other philosophers. Many expressivists, error 
theorists, and fictionalists have said that ‘intuitively it seems like’ when 
explaining trolley cases to students. Because of this there must be a 
broader sense of intuition at play in philosophical discussion than the one 
employed by Bealer. 
More generally, there are philosophers who are skeptical that the sorts of 
mental states described by Bealer actually exist. Yet this does not 
preclude them from ever saying something is intuitive. It would be 
surprising to find that all philosophers who use the expression 'that is 
intuitive' are thereby committed to some strong form of rationalism. With 
the exception of some experimental philosophers and other proponents of 
very strong versions of methodological naturalism, almost all 
philosophers appeal to intuition at some point. These appeals occur in all 
sorts of debates. It seems unlikely that all these philosophers are 
committed to the same very controversial positions in metaphysics and 
epistemology. Because of this it seems clear that some philosophers 
appeal to intuitions in ways much looser than the way Bealer describes. 
Cappelen (2012) argues that philosophers do not appeal to intuitions 
because he does not find that philosophers standardly appeal to intuitions  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in something like Bealer’s sense. To do so he has to argue that many 
philosophers are mistaken about their own practice and have false 
metaphilosophical views. It seems to me that a better option is to adopt a 
more liberal interpretation what philosophers mean by ‘intuitive’. Note 
that this is partly an empirical question about best way to interpret 
appeals to intuition in the practice of philosophy. So it can only be 
answered by doing a fair amount of descriptive metaphilosophy. 
Cappelen (2012) does an admirable job of that. Here I only consider two 
famous cases. Mostly though I offer intuitions as invitations as another 
way to understand intuitions because we need to define some alternatives 
to choose from before asking what fits best with standard philosophical 
practice. One lesson from experimental philosophy is that we are often 
not very clear about what we mean by ‘intuitive’. We need a better 
understanding of how appeals to intuition function in the philosophy. 
What reason though do we have to read appeals to intuitions as 
invitations? The first set of considerations comes from analyzing 
philosophical practice. Consider what you do when you teach your 
favorite thought experiment designed to elicit an intuition. If some 
students do not find it intuitive, what do you do? Perhaps, you throw up 
your hands and say ‘I guess it is not intuitive after all’. Or you might 
judge that they are not capable of latching on to some a priori truths. 
However, what some philosophers do is ask them for their reasons. They 
might not have much to say. Undergrads do not always cherish the 
Socratic method. Nevertheless, it seems like this is an opportunity for 
philosophizing. A professor might try to convince the student that 
something else he believes entails it or that he makes different judgments 
in analogous cases. For instance, many of my students do not have the 
semantic externalism intuition that one tries to elicit with the Twin Earth 
thought experiment. So I describe a case where a family owns a dog they 
call ‘Spot’. However, Spot is a twin and another family owns his twin and 
they call him ‘Spot’. Now imagine both dogs get loose at the park and 
each family calls out ‘Spot!’ Are those families referring to the same dog? 
Here almost all my students have the intuition that meaning is not in the 
head and we can begin to talk about how the cases differ. This seems like 
common practice in philosophy. It seems to me what I am doing is trying 
to make the invitation more enticing. This is just what the intuition as 
invitations account would predict one would do. 
Likewise, it seems to me that intuition as invitations is the most 
charitable way to read some philosophers. One reason for this is that 
some philosophers would see it as simply beside the point that the folk do 
not assent to what they find intuitive.  Perhaps, some philosophers think,  6
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or hope, that they could convince a fair number of the folk if the folk 
were inclined to listen to philosophical explanations. But a fair number of 
philosophers would see a survey of the opinion of the folk as utterly 
irrelevant to their claims. Of course, they may be mistaken about this. But 
the question at issue now is what they intend to be claiming, not whether 
that claim is true of false. The fact that they would explicitly deny that 
they are making some claim about some population is surely good 
grounds for thinking that they are not. The appeal to intuition as 
invitation proposal allows us to take them at their word and still see them 
doing something philosophically interesting. 
Now we turn to an examination of two famous cases to see if they fit our 
hypothesis. Epistemologists often talk about intuitions in Gettier cases 
and many philosophers would point to that argument as a prime example 
of an appeal to intuition. Let us suppose that it is a paradigm case of an 
appeal to intuition. But, as Cappelen (2012) noted, nowhere in the 
original paper does Gettier mention anything about intuitions. He does 
not claim that his counterexamples produce intuitions or are intuitively 
compelling. Rather he says things like “it is equally clear that Smith does 
not know” and “these two examples show that” in arguing against 
knowledge as justified true belief (1963:121-123). Given that Gettier says 
nothing about intuition, why do some many philosophers take it be a 
paradigm case of appealing to intuition? Well, Gettier does seem to invite 
us to share a judgment with him. He also seems to express confidence 
that his readers will accept once they think through it. Now if those are 
the reasons why philosophers see this as an appeal to intuition, then that 
supports the intuitions as invitations account. 
Moreover, I see no reason to think that Gettier is committed to anything 
about what the folk believe. That is, it seems that we could drop the 
sentence ‘of course, the folk do not realize this’ into his argument without 
contradiction. In fact, it would not make the paper any harder to interpret 
or understand. We would simply assume he is a bit of an intellectual snob 
about the folk. But, if we dropped the sentence ‘these claims are not very 
plausible and are not hard to deny’ his position would be much less clear. 
How could these cases show anything if they were not, at the least, very 
plausible? For these reasons, it seems to me if you think of Gettier’s 
argument as a prime example of an appeal to intuition, then you should 
think that some appeals to intuition function as invitations. 
Now Gettier never directly engages in any speech act that can be 
described as an invitation. Nevertheless, his example is compatible with 
the hypothesis. Thomson (1971) case of the unconscious violinist does on 
my reading clearly invite a judgment. Thomson describes that case and 
then asks you what you would think if the doctor told you that you could 
not unplug from the violinist. She says “I imagine you would regard this 
as outrageous” (1971: 49).  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Now this ‘imagine’ might be read as a prediction. Then she would be 
making a claim about how readers are likely to judge. But this strikes me 
as implausible. Thomson knows there is entrenched disagreement about 
the moral permissibility of abortion and that the folk rarely change their 
mind on such issues. She knows she is defending a position that many 
people reject and I don’t think we should assume that she believes she 
can change most people’s mind with one example. She knows that some 
of the folk will instead judge that she is morally depraved for being pro-
choice. We should not paint Thomson as outrageously optimistic about 
the power of philosophical arguments to change society. 
Instead it is more plausible to read this ‘imagine’ as a way of confidently 
making an invitation. It is like a bartender who sees a patron looking over 
a list of what is on tap and saying ‘I imagine you would like a beer’. And 
that is a way of inviting the patron to order a beer. On this reading 
Thomson is just inviting the reader to make the same judgments she does 
about the case. Which is a perfectly sensible thing to do in the course of a 
philosophy paper. !
4. Are Such Appeals Legitimate? !
Now we come to the real question. Are such appeals to intuition ever 
legitimate? Well, in certain contexts such appeals are epistemically 
unproblematic. When teaching a proof in a logic course it can be natural 
to say something along the lines of ‘by modus ponens we get the 
conclusion that’. The 'we' here functions much like the 'we' in our appeals 
to intuition. It is not making a claim about the mental states of our 
students; they might not be paying any attention. Rather it is inviting the 
students to think through the proof and come to the same judgment. Such 
expressions are also natural when teaching mathematics to children. A 
parent might say ‘when we carry the 1 we see that the answer is 522’. We 
express such confidence in these invitations because there is only one 
way to think on the matter. We are sure when the student or child takes 
their time to form a judgment they will reach the same conclusion. 
With this background, it is easy to see the worry skeptics have about 
appeals to intuition. The argument is that the expression of confidence 
associated with appeals to intuition is inappropriate because there are 
entrenched disagreements in philosophical disputes. Philosophical 
questions in metaphysics and epistemology are not like the questions in 
mathematics and logic. There is almost always more than one way to 
think about the issue. 
If this objection relies on the claim that appeals to intuition are only 
permissible where there is universal agreement on the content of the 
intuition, then it is not very persuasive. That standard is too high.  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We might reasonably offer P as evidence for some claim even if not 
everyone accepts P. One might take it that the question now is how much 
agreement must there be before we can legitimately make an appeal to 
intuition? That seems to me be the wrong question. We should evaluate 
the content of the intuition, not whether other people accept it. After we 
make a judgment we might need to assess the epistemic weight of 
disagreement. But that is a separate issue. First we need to decide to 
accept the invitation to make the judgment or not. And that depends on 
how reasonable we find it. 
We should also note that appeals to intuition might not be intended to 
convince everyone. They might sometimes simply serve to signal 
common ground in a debate. If our disagreement runs so deep that we 
share no premises, there is simply no hope of shedding any light on a 
problem. Appeals to intuition can serve as useful shorthand for signaling 
that common ground. It signals that there are some judgments about cases 
that need to be accepted by a theory or explained away. They cannot be 
ignored. It tells one's interlocutors that 'if you reject that claim I am not 
really sure how we can proceed’. 
Here the skeptic is likely to point out that appeals to intuition do not play 
such a limited role in the philosophical literature. That is true and I would 
not want to defend every appeal to intuition in the literature as legitimate 
or philosophically interesting. Yet, even in more contested cases appeals 
to intuition might be permissible. It places a burden on one's opponent to 
explain why some philosophers think that claim is so attractive. The 
strength of such appeals will depend on what is supposedly intuitive. If 
the invitation is not inviting, then the appeal will carry no weight. This is 
how it should be. We should assess the appeal to intuition based on the 
content of the claim, not on the fact that it is supposedly intuitive. 
Other experimental philosophers may object that I have misrepresented 
their position.  They present the restrictionist challenge. They claim that 7
intuitive judgments have shown to be effected by a number of irrelevant 
factors. Hence, they should be restricted from counting as evidence. 
Alexander and Weinberg (2006) present the worry in this way 
“proponents of the restrictionist view argue that empirical research into 
the nature of intuitions generated in response to thought experiments, 
rather than supporting the use of intuitions as evidence, challenges the 
suitability of intuitions to function in any evidentiary role” (62-63). So it 
is not that we misrepresent the folk, but that intuitive judgments are not 
reliable. We need empirical evidence that intuition judgments are reliable. 
This challenge assumes there is a special sort of judgment or mental state 
that is at issue. And that is a fair assumption given the way many 
philosophers have defended intuitions. But the intuitions as invitations  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proposal does not make that assumption. The judgment one is invited to 
make need not be pre-theoretical or considered. It need not be robust or 
quick. It has no special phenomenological component at all. It is only a 
philosophical judgment. That does not mean it is special or privileged in 
any epistemic sense. Only that it is indispensible to philosophical 
practice. One cannot do philosophy without philosophical judgment. 
There is no way to restrict philosophical judgments from philosophical 
practice. 
Here the restrictionist may reply that just because philosophical 
judgments are essential to philosophy does not show they are justified. 
Weinberg and Alexander (2014) argue that those who wish to stick with 
intuitions face a dilemma. Either one must defend a thin conception or a 
think conception of intuitions. In a thin conception, the mental states in 
questions have no distinctive traits. In a thick conception, for a mental 
state to be an intuition it must meet certain conditions. As should be clear, 
I favor a thin conception of invitations. Weinberg and Alexander claim 
that this approach comes “at the cost of evidential diversity” (italics in 
original. 2014: 190). That is, not all intuitions should be given the same 
weight and we need some way to distinguish between the good from the 
bad. Moreover, the empirical work on philosophical judgments show that 
these judgments are problematically sensitive to matters that are 
irrelevant to the matter at hand. So the restricitionist challenge stands. 
One response to this challenge is to claim that we separate the good 
intuitions from the bad ones by doing philosophy. There is no evidential 
standard based on different types of mental states. Instead they are based 
on the content of the mental state and the quality of the argument. The 
quality of the judgment determines how strongly we should weigh it in 
deliberation. If some one invites us to judge that P, we have to decide 
whether we think P is true or not. That requires using philosophical 
judgment. Here the restrictionist will point to the experiments and say we 
cannot trust philosophical judgment given the data we have. They claim it 
is incumbent on the defender of intuition to explain why philosophical 
judgments of philosophers are immune to problems of the philosophical 
judgments of the folk. And that requires a thick conception of intuition to 
distinguish some philosophical judgments from others. 
Weinberg and Alexander lay out three conditions that any thick account 
needs to meet. They are: 
The Immunity Condition: “genuine philosophical intuitions are not 
themselves susceptible, to any worrisome degree, to the sorts of 
problematic effects that form the basis of the restrictionist 
challenge” (2014: 195) 
The Hippocracity Condition: the constraints on philosophical 
practices must “do no harm to those practices” (196)  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The Manifestability Condition: the factors “need to be detectable, 
and not just in principle or theory, but in practice and-most of all-
from the armchair.” (196) 
Now I will argue that much of current philosophical practice, as 
understood on the intuitions as invitations model, meets all three 
conditions. 
Experimental philosophers often lament the use of the armchair in 
philosophy. I take that as short hand for the fact that philosophical 
methods are non-empirical. One just sits in an armchair and thinks about 
some case. And that is exactly what they ask subjects in their experiments 
to do. Here I want to argue there are a number of epistemically relevant 
differences between asking the folk for judgments and actual 
philosophical practice. There is much more to the practice of philosophy 
than thinking alone in an armchair. I will describe my own case, but what 
I say roughly applies to ever working philosopher I know. 
At the outset, I get an idea that I find compelling. I will think about it 
quite a lot before I share it with anyone else. Eventually, I find a friend to 
share it with and I ask them what they think. They almost always offer 
constructive criticism. They say things like ‘what about this similar case’ 
or ‘try describing it in this way’ or ‘does it matter that it is a man in the 
example’. I trust you have had enough philosophical conversations that 
you could go on expanding that disjunction in countless way. These 
discussions are often repeated until I see my friend give me the ‘oh no, 
not again’ look, as one receives from pushing a friend’s patience too far. 
It should be noted that I often do this to more than one friend. After all 
that, I begin writing. Again I seek comments from people I trust. They are 
often critical and suggest various changes. I rewrite trying to address 
these worries. Next, I try to present at conferences. I invite my audience 
to judge that P and a commentator usually does everything she can to 
discourage the audience from accepting that invitation. Hopefully, I have 
productive discussion with strangers or acquaintances after the 
presentation. Again, I rethink and rewrite. Finally, I submit to a journal in 
order to pass peer review. Often papers are rejected with substantial 
comments. Again, there is rethinking and rewriting. Sometimes this 
involves reconsiderations of the most fundamental claims. This whole 
process typically takes years. I get feedback from dozens of very 
intelligent people who consider the case in a wide variety of 
circumstances. If the idea ever sees the light of day in a journal, it has 
passed a test of critical reflections by me, some of my friends, some 
strangers and at least a few expert anonymous reviewers. Think about 
how different this process is from asking random groups of people to 
make judgments based on reading a passage. The only similarity is that 
they are thinking about the same case.  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This process clearly meets the manifestability condition. We all have had 
the experience of an idea we like failing at any of the previously 
mentioned stages. Immunity is a bit harder to establish conclusively. But 
it should be noted that my interlocutors and I consider that case in a 
variety of different circumstances. The way it is presented changes. The 
order that it is presented differs throughout the process. The mood of the 
audience fluctuates. What my audience thinks about before they think 
about my case varies. Of course, most philosophers do not systematically 
vary these factors. However, given the length at which these cases are 
deliberated and argued about there is good reason to think these 
judgments are immune to the factors we find present in the studies of 
experimental philosophy. Hence, I remain optimistic that group 
judgments made after careful and long deliberation by dozens of experts 
are immune to many of the foibles of individual judgments of non-
experts who consider the case briefly. 
The Hippocracity condition is probably the hardest to establish. How can 
we rule out the possibility that philosophical training and debate 
somehow harm our ability to make judgments? We need to remind 
ourselves that mere possibilities are not enough to raise the worries 
experimental philosopher aim to realize. There needs to be a real 
hypothesis that has some significant probability of being true. The most 
likely candidate is that those who engage in this practice are a biased 
sample. Perhaps trading in intuitions is merely self-congratulatory 
backslapping that enforces in-group ways of thinking. There is a 
possibility that people with conflicting intuitions are not part of the 
profession. 
Maybe we need a more representative sample. This is an important 
concern. 
It is certainly true that philosophy needs more diversity. It would be a 
very good to recruit and train more women, people of color and people of 
different socio-economic backgrounds. But the claim that we need more 
diversity of judgment is less plausible. In fact, it is very surprising to see 
the claim that philosophy suffers from some kind of problem of 
homogeneity of judgment or coerced agreement. One sure way to get 
noticed in the field is to offer an interesting argument for some highly 
unpopular view. Individuality and novelty is prized, not squashed. It is 
also an often-lamented fact that philosophers disagree about almost 
everything. Almost every position has an advocate. So given the 
incredible diversity of views defended it is difficult to believe that the 
discipline suffers from some kind forced intuition conformity. 
Perhaps, the thought is that we need the diversity that comes from 
including people of different levels of philosophical training. Professional 
philosophers are a non-random group, but there is good reason to focus 
on that biased sample. They have been trained to do philosophy.  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By that I just mean they are qualified to teach an introduction to logic or 
critical thinking course that most people could not do. They know what 
necessary and sufficient conditions are. They understand validity. They 
know what counts as a counterexample to a generalization. They also 
know many of the most common fallacies that people commit. People 
untrained in philosophy do not know that. They are more likely to fall 
into simple confusions that philosophers are better at avoiding. In 
general, the thinking of philosophers is clearer. This does mean that they 
have privileged access to the nature of knowledge or reference, but it 
does mean they are less likely to be lead astray by irrelevancies. 
Extensive philosophical training makes one well qualified to decide 
whether to accept some philosophical judgment. 
I can see no other potential harm that is likely to corrupt philosophical 
judgment. So I take that the Hippocracity condition has been met. And 
with that there is good reason to think actual philosophical practice meets 
the challenge that the restrictionist sets for it. !
5. Conclusion !
This paper has not argued that the skeptical argument misses the mark on 
all appeals to intuition in literature. Nor has it argued that philosophers 
can rest comfortably in the armchair ignoring science or experimental 
philosophy. What it has argued is that in many cases when you hear a 
philosopher say “P is what we intuitively believe' the proper response is 
not 'who is this ‘we’?” The proper response is to wonder whether one 
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